I interpret the difficulties of normative population theory in terms of a more general problem with consequentialist ethics. Specifically, I
examine an impossibility theorem for ranking social outcomes when we treat different ethical values as commensurable. I show that we cannot find a social welfare function that satisfies four chosen axioms.
Apparently reasonable intuitions about the boundedness of particular ethical values-that is, the maximum weight that one value can receive when compared with all others -turn out to be inconsistent with other plausible moral intuitions or do not cover the entire range of potential paradoxical results.2
If we consider the four axioms behind the impossibility theorem acceptable, we should abandon the search for Theory X and should instead study the implications of impossibility theorems for how we reason about ethics. Alternatively, we might consider at least one of the four axioms unacceptable. In this case the impossibility theorem shows which moral intuitions we must revise to construct Theory X and gives us a clue about how Theory X might look. The following exercise should be interpreted as a diagnostic which clarifies the tradeoffs involved with accepting or rejecting particular moral axioms. The
Repugnant Conclusion is implicitly an account of conflict between different values and how we aggregate those values. The impossibility result is analogous to the violations of Arrow's impossibility theorem studied in the social choice literature. In the literature on social choice, certain specific paradoxes of voting, such as cycling (with majority rule it can be true that A beats B, B beats C, but C beats A), led to broader results-specifically, no method of aggregating ordinal preferences can avoid violating certain plausible axioms, such as transitivity. Just as cycling is a special case that illustrates a more general problem with voting rules, the Repugnant Conclusion (and the other paradoxes presented below) is a special case that illustrates a more general problem with aggregating ethical values to rank outcomes. Both Arrow's theorem and the Repugnant Conclusion serve a diagnostic function in helping us revise our moral intuitions. The more populous society can always welfare dominate if it contains enough lives. Feasibility considerations are ignored deliberately in this comparison. The point is not whether the highly populated society is possible but rather whether we would prefer it if it were possible. We ask this hypothetical question to clarify our thoughts on how utilities should be compared to other values. Specifically, it raises the question of how total utility is to be bounded, if at all.4
The Repugnant Conclusion does not suggest that the highly populated society is the best society imaginable. An equally populated society with higher amounts of prosperity and culture would be better.
Instead, the argument implies that for any plausible social welfare function, we can always present a pairwise comparison where that social welfare function implies preferring an unappealing alternative.
The Repugnant Conclusion is truly repugnant. Parfit is not postulating a world where individuals eke out a mediocre living and drive home to a small home in the suburbs. Rather, each individual experiences only a very small amount ofjoy in his or her entire life. Human existence is a vast monotony which, although not painful, contains little of value. Parfit refers to a world of "muzak and potatoes."5 In the limit, we can imagine the utility of this life as no more than the smallest nonzero epsilon. Objections to these axioms are considered in more detail in Section IV below; I do not intend the initial presentation as a series of arguments for accepting the axioms as a moral theory. The axioms simply mark some starting points for the subsequent discussion of the relevant moral issues.6 I will now consider each axiom in more detail.
Axiom (1). Axiom (2). -Total utility is one value that matters in the social welfare function. I call this the value of total utility. A world-state with more utility than another is better in at least one respect, with regard to utility. This axiom does not require that the world-state with more utility is better, all things considered. Axiom (2) simply postulates total utility as a relevant moral value.
Both axioms (1) and (2) are necessary to define the problems under consideration, but they do not represent the centerpiece of the impossibility theorem. The primary clash between values is given by axioms (3) and (4). These two axioms, if understood properly, conflict to produce the impossibility result.
Axiom (3). -More than one value (e.g., total utility, freedom, justice, equality, etc.) should matter or supply relevant input for our evaluation of outcomes. I call this the value pluralism axiom.
What does it mean that more than one value should "matter"? I Our unwillingness to accept the Repugnant Conclusion therefore requires that we attach significance to some other value or values. We feel that one value, in that case total utility, ought not be able to trump all other values so easily. The nonvanishing value axiom, like the value pluralism axiom, represents an intuition about boundedness. Value pluralism implied that no single value should be able to dwarf all others in importance, no matter how large that single value becomes. The nonvanishing value axiom tells us that no single value should be dwarfed in importance by any others, at the margin, no matter how large that single value becomes. Each axiom reflects a different aspect of boundedness-an ethical value should not be allowed to become infinitely large or infinitely small in importance.
These two intuitions about boundedness clash to provide the basic impossibility result. From axioms (1) and (2), it follows that utility must be commensurable with other values. If not, different alternatives cannot be compared with each other. We thus can postulate a Conclusion can arise through a conflict between two aspects of a single value, such as total utility and average utility. This view is consistent with the substance of my presentation, although not with the semantics. I define average and total utility as two separate values. The relevant point is that the Repugnant Conclusion requires more than one input into a social welfare function; for the substance of the argument it does not matter whether we label these inputs as "different values" or "different aspects of the same value." social welfare function, SW, which compares utility and nonutility features to produce a final evaluation. Without loss of generality, I
call the nonutility values "culture" and "dignity." When comparing social state A and social state B, we compare SW (Total UtilityA, CultureA, DignityA) SW (Total UtilityB, CultureB, DignityB)
The Repugnant Conclusion postulates that there exists a Total UtilityA sufficiently large that the social welfare of situation A exceeds the social welfare of situation B., regardless of the values assigned to culture and dignity in the two cases.
Here is where the central clash between axioms (3) and (4) (2) further units of N must have virtually no effect on the social welfare function. Axiom (3) rules out the former alternative, and axiom (4) rules out the latter. The Appendix sketches a mathematical proof of this reasoning.
IV. WHICH AXIOMS SHOULD BE DISCARDED?
Since no social welfare function can satisfy all four axioms, for Theory X requires that we drop at least one axiom. Some als may see axiom (1)-universal domain-as the most vulnerable of the four axioms.9 Dropping axiom (1) implies that a moral theory or social welfare function cannot sensibly rank all of the relevant alternatives. More specifically, social welfare functions may cease to provide relevant comparisons when the alternatives have a serious imbalance with regard to a particular value, such as utility.
Rejecting universal domain, however, constitutes a surrender, not a solution. We are discarding the axiom simply to forestall the Repugnant Conclusion and other paradoxes; we might as well admit that consequentialism has failed. The Repugnant Conclusion appears repugnant precisely because we initially believed that the two societies Axiom (4), the nonvanishing value axiom, is less fo value pluralism. Value pluralism is plausible because we one value should not be able to make all other values i margin. Violating the nonvanishing value axiom, howe that only one value is made irrelevant at some margin. it intolerable for all other complementary values to be we might find it tolerable that one value, utility, som irrelevant.
Capped Utility
Invoking capped utility allows us to sidestep the Repugnant Conclusion, albeit at the cost of violating axiom (4). Capped utility solutions place an upper limit on how much additions of utility can increase the value of the social welfare function. Under one set of solutions, increments of utility can only contribute a maximum number of points to social welfare, no matter how much utility that society contains. Alternatively, we might cap the quantity of utility that can be created through the addition of new lives or through the addition of new lives below a certain level of well-being. The most sophisticated forms of capped utility postulate a diminishing asymptote. An appropriately chosen function will imply that increasing the number of people always increases the number of utility points, but at a diminishing rate. With the proper mathematical specification, the number of total utility points can approach, but never reach, the target level.
The clash between capped utility and the nonvanishing value axiom is easy to see. Near the upper limit, or asymptotic bound, large increases in utility do not outweigh very small declines in other ethical value(s). No matter how slight the postulated decrease in other values, the net contribution of large sums of utility is even slighter, if we are close enough to the asymptote. In lieu of allowing utility to dominate all other values, we have created a margin where other values can dominate utility.
Capping the contribution of utility can prevent the Repugnant Conclusion. Even if we increase the number of people to a very large sum, the total utility of the resulting society cannot add more than a certain amount to the overall measure of goodness. We avoid having a single ethical value dominate all others in importance.
Several ethical intuitions can generate capped utility. We might believe that a good society, all things considered, is defined by certain objective goods, such as dignity or culture. These goods may hold a lexicographic priority over utility across certain margins, implying that no amount of utility can make up for very small quantities of these goods. A "perfectionist" concept of a well-ordered life or society might take precedence over the summation of constituent values, or we might believe that a "good society" is a holistic concept that cannot be broken The rejection of axiom (4) through capped utility appears even more plausible when we consider the formulations of some particular population dilemmas. These formulations talk of adding new individuals to a world already fairly well populated. We might be willing to attach asymptotically diminishing value to the creation of new individuals who do not currently exist, even if we do not wish to cap the importance of total utility for all other comparisons.
Despite these points, we should not hasten to discard axiom (4). The Hurka-Ng solution provides one of the more promising means of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion. Nonetheless, this solution does not eliminate the more general problems of boundedness discussed below in Section V. Furthermore, the Hurka-Ng solution is operationally equivalent to postulating interaction effects, a view which I criticize directly below.
Capping the Net Contribution of Utility through Interaction Effects
Another set of asymptotic social welfare functions postulates negative effects on other values as the number of low-utility individuals rises.
The increases in population and utility that produce the Repugnant Conclusion, for instance, might push down some other social value, such as dignity. As we add successive numbers of low-utility individu- By dignity I mean the ability of an individual to achieve some pattern-based conception of the good life. Negative dignity implies that with regard to dignity, an individual detracts more from society than he or she adds.'6
In this context I use dignity only as an illustrative example. The same arguments will hold if we can find some other value that declines as we multiply the number of low-utility individuals. The nonutility value, however, must decline through negative effects associated with the increase in utility itself. By assumption, the additional individuals do not harm others or in any way affect the rest of the world; we can imagine them being born on a distant planet. The new individuals bring no negative externalities. Interaction effects therefore arise only when the presence of new individuals or new utilities affects some pattern-based value used to evaluate the overall worth of a society.'7 Under these social welfare functions, the creation of high-utility individuals does not necessarily lower dignity points. The net contribution of new, low-utility individuals to social welfare is capped and asymptotically diminishing, even though utility per se is not capped.
Interaction effects provide a relatively promising means out of the Repugnant Conclusion. Postulating a negative interaction between utility and dignity violates only axiom (4), the nonvanishing value axiom. As we have already seen, the nonvanishing value axiom is the least persuasive of the four axioms. Interaction effects do not rule out the importance of utility in more general situations. Utility has a vanishing importance at the margin only when we try to increase utility by adding large numbers of low-utility individuals.
The case for such interaction effects is nonetheless far from airtight. Interaction effects avoid the Repugnant Conclusion only by making the dignity value of a low-utility individual negative when the 16. I do not wish to push the definition of dignity or use of the dignity concept too hard. As we will see below, I will reject this solution rather than argue for it, and thus I do not cover the other potential weaknesses that this argument may bring. For the remainder of this section I speak of dignity but also refer to whichever other nonutility values might turn negative with population growth. In addition, interaction effects do not capture our intuitions about the nature of dignity. For interaction effects to prevent the Repugnant Conclusion, large numbers of low-utility individuals must eventually acquire negative dignity, not merely zero dignity. The net asymptotic effect caused by population growth comes from increasingly negative values for dignity. The use of interaction effects to derive an overall asymptotic value for total utility appears suspiciously motivated by the desire to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion rather than by any particular microfoundations from a theory of dignity. We have some intuitions about how numbers of people translate into social welfare; that is, we believe that some kind of cap should be present. Our inability to express this intuition in a convincing fashion leads us to give dignity a very partic lar role-supporting a net asymptotic effect for utility-in the social welfare function.
The postulated solution to the Repugnant Conclusion is not robust to small changes in our notion of dignity. We might, for instance, plausibly believe any of the following about dignity: (1) the lesser dignity of low-utility individuals, compared to high-utility individuals, springs from their lower level of well-being and not from their numbers, (2) negative dignity does not eat up most of the value of a life, even as the number of individuals becomes very large, and (3) an individual whose life is worth living can never have a negative dignity value.
Any of these three beliefs about dignity, if true, would invalidate the use of interaction effects, on the basis of dignity, to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. The point is not that these three beliefs are necessarily compelling. Rather, it seems odd that our avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion requires that we reject these three beliefs about dignity. Our dislike of the Repugnant Conclusion appears more fundamental than the positions we might take on the microfoundations of dignity or whatever other interacting value we choose.19
Most generally, the attribution of negative dignity to large numbers of low-utility individuals does not resolve the problem of boundedness per se. It only attempts to limit the net contribution of large numbers of people to the social welfare function. Capping utility across the dimension of numbers simply modifies the forms in which Repugnant Conclusion-like comparisons arise. Rather than multiplying the number of persons in society, we can create other utility-theoretic dilemmas by changing the distribution of utility among given individuals. Section V shows how additional conundrums can be created, even if we can cap the value of total utility obtained through population increases.
V. THE GENERALITY OF THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDEDNESS
The various means of bounding utility provide ad hoc attempts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and related paradoxes. The postulated bounds can be circumvented by constructing other comparisons or counterexamples with different logical structures. The impossibility theorem presented above extends beyond the comparisons involved in population economics. The essence of the Repugnant Conclusion is to overwhelm nonutility values by adding together many small utilities. Similar comparisons of utilities arise in many situations, not just in comparisons between different populations. The theory of optimal population was simply an area where the relevant ethical dilemmas were discovered in some vivid and compelling forms.
The following discussion will present a number of aggregation dilemmas analogous to the Repugnant Conclusion. In each case we must compare an aggregation of many very small utilities to some other value or set of values. The point is not that these dilemmas resemble the Repugnant Conclusion in every regard or that they provide perfect analogies. Rather, the differences between the Repugnant Conclusion and these other aggregation dilemmas do not matter as long as the issue of boundedness remains unresolved. In the given comparisons, aggregate utility overwhelms all other nonutility values. The nonutility differences between the Repugnant Conclusion comparison and other aggregation comparisons become irrelevant for how the social welfare function ranks outcomes. I am not defending the moral propriety of this forced irrelevance but rather use it to show the far-reaching nature of the problem of boundedness.
The same point can be made by redescribing what is at stake in the literature on the Repugnant Conclusion. The Repugnant Conclusion appears to raise at least three different moral issues. Does adding more people make an outcome better? How do we trade off values of great intensity against values of lesser intensity? And how do we weigh the interests of the many against the few? Without meaning to downplay the importance of these questions, I am focusing on the even broader issue of boundedness. Rather than addressing the above questions directly, this article, through generalizing the Repugnant Conclusion, is asking a more primitive question: How can we have a moral theory where these questions matter at all? Without a defensible concept of boundedness underlying the social welfare function, any particular moral issue can be made to appear irrelevant to our final evaluations of social states.
The generalizations of the Repugnant Conclusion illustrate the difficulty of developing a satisfactory concept of boundedness. Specifically, these generalizations weaken the case for pinpointing axiom (4) as the source of the ethical dilemmas discussed above. The particular means of bounding utility, suggested in the preceding section above, all fall vulnerable to at least one counterexample. If we bound the utility generated through newborns, aggregation dilemmas can be reformulated with currently existing persons (see all four aggregation dilemmas which follow). If we bound the utility enjoyed by low-utility Cowen Learningfrom the Repugnant Conclusion 769 individuals, aggregation dilemmas can be reformulated using highutility individuals (again, see the four aggregation dilemmas which follow). More generally, these other aggregation dilemmas suggest (but do not prove) that other potential means of bounding utility also will be vulnerable to counterexamples. Axiom (4) The Conundrum of the Cure. -The earth is inhabited by a very large number of persons of equal age who are all faced with the prospect of immediate death through disease. Two different life-saving technologies are available, kidney dialysis and a complete cure for the threatening disease. Dialysis prolongs everyone's life for an additional thirty years but impoverishes society because the dialysis machines are so costly. Each remaining life would be worth living, but only by epsilon utility. The second alternative, the cure, would give two billion individuals an additional thirty years of healthy and happy life. But most persons would die immediately because not enough cures can be manufactured.23 Unlike in the Repugnant Conclusion, we are not choosing population size de novo; we are evaluating how future utilities should be distributed across individuals who are already living. Nonetheless, we are asking whether the remaining population should resemble the highly populated world of the Repugnant Conclusion or whether it should resemble a less populated society that is richer in other values. We again confront the boundedness of total utility-this time separated from the issue of how to value unborns and future generations. Arrow showed that when the social welfare function relies on ordinal rankings generated from conflicting preferences (or conflicting values), the social welfare function will be characterized by dictatorship. The logic behind this result is compelling, once we accept the axioms. If we consider a basic two-person situation, the absence of preference commensurability implies that we cannot resolve value clashes without giving one person his or her way. Arrow's proof
showed that the more complicated N-person case always can be partitioned into a series of two-person comparisons. Any algorithm used to resolve two-person clashes of preference, when applied consistently, will make one person the dictator in any clash of preference.
Many economists and philosophers have pointed out that we can sidestep Arrow's theorem by the introduction of cardinal utility, that is, information about preference intensity. When the utilities of different individuals can be compared, social welfare functions can escape the dictatorship result. Returning to the simple two-person case, we might use a function that ranks outcomes according to their aggregate utility, thus abandoning axiom (5a).28
The utility aggregation dilemmas studied in the article show that introducing cardinal utility information and eliminating axiom (5a) does not ensure a reasonable social welfare function. The resulting social welfare function will satisfy Arrow's remaining axioms but will not simultaneously satisfy the four axioms outlined in this article, or avoid the dilemmas raised by Parfit. 
